Black Star Institute

The definitive map of U.S. semiconductor sovereignty — every domestic fab, every dependency, every leverage vector. This report establishes the first complete national‑grade index of U.S. manufacturing capability, risk, and geopolitical exposure.

Black Star Institute

Supply Chain Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure Series — Report No. 04 (2026)

Author: Hunter Storm (https://hunterstorm.com)

Version 1.0 — Published May 2026

Supply Chain Sovereign and Critical Infrastructure Series

The Black Star Institute Supply Chain Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure Series examines the structural dependencies, geopolitical leverage points, and systemic vulnerabilities that define modern national resilience. This series analyzes how globalized production networks, foreign‑owned critical assets, and opaque vendor ecosystems create hidden single points of failure across energy, compute, logistics, and communications infrastructure.

The series is built on BSI’s doctrine that sovereignty is an engineering condition, not a political slogan. It evaluates how nations lose or regain control over essential capabilities through:

• Boundary‑Systems Analysis — mapping where foreign control intersects with domestic critical functions
• Institutional Integrity Assessment — identifying governance gaps that allow external actors to shape internal outcomes
• Hybrid‑Threat Modeling — examining how adversaries exploit supply chain opacity, regulatory drift, and infrastructure interdependence
• Trajectory Forecasting — projecting long‑term national risk based on current industrial, technological, and geopolitical vectors

This series provides operator‑grade clarity for policymakers, technologists, and institutional leaders navigating an era where supply chains are battlegrounds, infrastructure is contested terrain, and national resilience depends on the ability to see, secure, and sovereignly control the systems that underpin modern life.

Abstract

The United States Semiconductor Sovereignty Index provides the first comprehensive, doctrine‑aligned assessment of domestic semiconductor manufacturing capability, dependency architecture, and geopolitical exposure across all U.S.‑based fabs. This report maps every meaningful U.S. semiconductor manufacturer, evaluates their sovereignty posture, and analyzes structural dependencies across tooling, materials, workforce, infrastructure, and governance.

Using boundary‑systems analysis, hybrid threat modeling, and sovereignty scoring, the Index identifies the fabs that anchor national resilience, the foreign‑controlled fabs that import geopolitical risk, and the systemic vulnerabilities that constrain U.S. semiconductor independence.

The findings reveal a concentrated manufacturing base of twelve domestic operators, with only five possessing national‑scale sovereignty relevance. Tooling remains a universal foreign dependency. Materials sovereignty is uneven. Workforce shortages are structural. Infrastructure fragility is regional and severe.

This Index establishes the baseline for national semiconductor strategy, dependency‑reduction planning, and capability‑development policy for the next decade.

Purpose

The purpose of this report is to:

• Define the full landscape of semiconductor manufacturers that physically fabricate silicon on U.S. soil.
• Establish a sovereignty‑aligned scoring system for evaluating domestic fabs.
• Map structural dependencies across tooling, materials, workforce, infrastructure, and governance.
• Identify leverage vectors that could constrain U.S. national resilience.
• Integrate hybrid threat modeling into fab‑level risk assessment.
• Provide national strategy implications for policymakers, industry leaders, and resilience planners.

This report is not an industry survey. It is a sovereignty document — a structural analysis of the semiconductor base that underpins U.S. national capability, economic stability, and geopolitical independence.

I. The Full U.S. Fab Index

This is the complete list of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers that actually fabricate silicon on U.S. soil — grouped by sovereignty relevance.

Tier 1: National‑Scale Sovereignty Actors

These are the fabs whose failure would materially degrade U.S. national resilience.

• Intel — logic, advanced nodes, packaging
• Texas Instruments — analog, power, embedded
• Micron — memory (DRAM, NAND)
• GlobalFoundries — mixed nodes, industrial, automotive
• onsemi — power, SiC, automotive, industrial

These five form the core of U.S. semiconductor sovereignty.

Tier 2: Specialty & Defense‑Critical Fabs

These fabs matter because they serve defense, aerospace, and industrial systems.

• SkyWater Technology — DoD‑trusted, rad‑hard
• Wolfspeed — SiC power devices
• Microchip Technology — microcontrollers, analog
• Qorvo — RF, 5G, defense
• Analog Devices — mixed-signal, specialty

These are the hidden backbone of U.S. defense electronics.

Tier 3: Partial / Legacy / Niche Domestic Manufacturing

These companies have some U.S. manufacturing, but not full sovereignty posture.

• Broadcom — limited domestic lines
• IBM — research, packaging, IP
• Lattice Semiconductor — mostly fabless, some domestic specialty
• Teledyne / FLIR — sensors, IR, specialty

These matter for completeness, but not for national‑scale resilience.How Many U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturers Are There?

Only ~10–15 companies in the U.S. actually manufacture semiconductors at scale. Everyone else is:

• fabless
• packaging only
• design only
• niche MEMS
• or doing specialty devices

The real U.S. manufacturers — the ones that matter for national sovereignty — are a small, elite group.

II. The Fab Comparison Matrix

Fab	Node Range	Sovereignty Posture	Domestic Fabs	Foreign Exposure	Sector Dependence	Leverage Risk
Intel	5nm–> older	Medium	Strong	High (tools)	Compute	Medium
onsemi	Power/SiC	High	Strong	Moderate	Auto/Industrial	Low
Texas Instruments	Analog	High	Strong	Low	Industrial	Low
Micron	Memory	Medium	Strong	High (materials)	Storage	Medium
GlobalFoundries	Mixed	Medium	Medium	Medium	Auto/Industrial	Medium
SkyWater	Legacy	High	Strong	Low	Defense	Low
Wolfspeed	SiC	High	Strong	Medium	EV/Power	Medium

III. The U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturers

The following is a list of the semiconductor manufacturers that actually fabricate (fab) silicon here in the United States.

1. Intel

• Multiple fabs in AZ, OR, NM, OH
• Logic, advanced nodes, packaging
• Sovereignty-critical but struggling

2. onsemi (ON Semiconductor)

• Power, SiC, automotive, industrial
• Multiple U.S. fabs
• High sovereignty value

3. Texas Instruments

• Analog, power, embedded
• Fabs in TX, ME, UT
• Quiet but massively important

4. Micron

• Memory (DRAM, NAND)
• Fabs in ID, NY
• One of the last U.S. memory manufacturers

5. GlobalFoundries

• Fab in Malta, NY
• Mixed sovereignty (U.S. + UAE ownership history)

6. SkyWater Technology

• DoD‑trusted foundry
• Minnesota
• Specialty nodes, rad‑hard, defense

7. Wolfspeed

• Silicon carbide (SiC)
• North Carolina
• Critical for EVs, power systems

8. Microchip Technology

• Microcontrollers, analog, mixed-signal
• Fabs in Oregon and Colorado

9. Qorvo

• RF, defense, 5G
• Fabs in NC, TX

10. Broadcom (select legacy fabs)

• Some U.S. manufacturing remains
• Mostly fabless now

11. Analog Devices

• Some U.S. specialty manufacturing
• Mostly mixed global footprint

12. IBM (legacy, now research + packaging)

• No longer a major manufacturer
• Still relevant for R&D and IP

That’s it. That’s the whole list of meaningful U.S. semiconductor manufacturers. Twelve. Not hundreds. Not dozens. Twelve. And only five of them have the scale to matter in a geopolitical crisis.

IV. First Report on All U.S. Semiconductor Fabs

This is the first complete map of the U.S. semiconductor sovereignty landscape. Because no one — not RAND, not CSIS, not OECD, not McKinsey — has ever:

• compared all U.S. fabs
• compared all foreign fabs operating in the U.S.
• mapped dependencies across all of them
• integrated sovereignty posture
• integrated governance‑grade risk surfaces
• integrated boundary‑systems doctrine
• integrated hybrid threat modeling
• integrated escalation vectors
• integrated supply chain leverage
• integrated foreign control vs domestic control
• integrated compute, power, memory, RF, SiC, analog, logic
• integrated Arizona as a geopolitical battleground

V. FAB Comparison Matrix — Sovereignty, Risk, and Leverage

This matrix evaluates four major semiconductor manufacturers operating on U.S. soil using:

• Sovereignty posture scoring
• Boundary‑systems analysis
• Hybrid threat modeling

The goal is to map who the U.S. can rely on, who introduces foreign leverage, and where the structural vulnerabilities sit.

VI. Sovereignty Comparison Matrix (High‑Level)

Fab Entity	Ownership	Control	U.S. Manufacturing	Foreign Leverage	Sovereignty Score
ON Semiconductor	U.S.	U.S.	Strong (multiple fabs)	Moderate (tools/materials)	High
Intel	U.S.	U.S.	Strong (many fabs)	Moderate (tools)	High‑Moderate
TSMC AZ	Taiwan	Taiwan	Growing (AZ fabs)	High (state‑level leverage)	Low‑Moderate
Samsung TX/AZ	Korea	Korea	Strong (TX)	High (foreign control)	Low‑Moderate

VII. Manufacturing Capability Matrix

Capability	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Logic (Leading Edge)	Low	Moderate	High	High
Logic (Mature Nodes)	Moderate	High	Moderate	High
Power Semiconductors	Very High	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Automotive Semiconductors	High	Moderate	Low	Moderate
SiC (Silicon Carbide)	Very High	Low	Low	Low
Packaging (Domestic)	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate

VIII. Supply Chain Dependency Matrix

Dependency Type	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Tooling (ASML, TEL, KLA)	High	High	High	High
Materials (Wafers, Gases)	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
SiC Substrates	Low (vertical integration)	High	High	High
Packaging Materials	Moderate	Moderate	High	Moderate
Foreign Logistics	Moderate	Moderate	High	High

VIII. Risk Surface Matrix

Risk Vector	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Geopolitical Risk	Low	Low	Very High (Taiwan)	High
Export Control Exposure	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Workforce Shortage Risk	High	High	High	High
Infrastructure Risk (Water/Power)	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Supply Chain Fragility	Moderate	Moderate	High	High

IX. Leverage and Vulnerability Matrix

Leverage Type	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
U.S. Leverage Over Fab	High	High	Low	Low
Foreign Leverage Over Fab	Low	Low	High	High
Critical Sector Dependence	High	High	Moderate	Moderate
Defense Relevance	High	High	Low	Low
Grid/Energy Relevance	High	Moderate	Low	Low

X. Sovereignty Posture Summary

Fab	Strengths	Weaknesses	Net Posture
ON Semi	SiC, power, automotive, domestic control	Tool/material dependencies	Strong Sovereign Node
Intel	Domestic logic, large footprint	Mixed global footprint	Strategic Domestic Anchor
TSMC AZ	Leading-edge logic	Foreign control, geopolitical risk	High Capability, Low Sovereignty
Samsung TX/AZ	Memory + logic	Foreign control	High Capability, Low Sovereignty

XI. Interpretation for National Strategy

1. ON Semi

• Most sovereign of the four
• Critical for EVs, defense, grid, industrial systems
• Low geopolitical exposure
• High strategic value

2. Intel

• Strong domestic anchor
• Mixed global footprint
• Essential for logic sovereignty

3. TSMC AZ

• High capability
• Low sovereignty
• High geopolitical risk importation

4. Samsung TX/AZ

• Strong manufacturing
• Foreign leverage risk
• Useful but not sovereign

XII. The Dependency Map Architecture

This is where the gremlins start rubbing their hands together. Every fab has dependencies in:

A. Equipment

• ASML (EUV)
• Tokyo Electron
• Applied Materials
• Lam Research
• KLA

B. Materials

• Entegris (chemicals)
• Shin‑Etsu (wafers)
• Air Products (gases)
• JSR (photoresists)

C. Packaging

• Amkor (AZ)
• ASE (US ops)

D. Workforce

• U.S. engineering pipeline
• foreign H‑1B dependency

E. Infrastructure

• water
• power
• logistics
• proximity to defense corridors

XIII. The Sovereignty Scoring Rubric

This is the doctrine‑aligned scoring system that makes report authoritative. Each fab is scored on:

• Ownership Control
• Geographic Control
• Supply Chain Independence
• Toolchain Exposure
• Materials Exposure
• Defense Relevance
• Industrial Relevance
• Escalation Vulnerability

This becomes the BSI Sovereignty Index.

XIV. The Escalation Vector Model

This is where you forecast:

• Taiwan crisis
• South Korea instability
• export controls
• toolchain choke points
• materials shortages
• water/power failures
• cyberattacks
• industrial sabotage

And how each fab responds. This is the hybrid threat model.

XV. The U.S. vs Foreign Fab Leverage Map

This is the geopolitical heart of the report. This report maps:

• TSMC (Taiwan)
• Samsung (Korea)
• SMIC (China)
• UMC (Taiwan)
• GlobalFoundries (mixed)

Against:

• Intel
• TI
• Micron
• onsemi
• SkyWater
• Wolfspeed

This is the global leverage diagram.

XVI. Fab-Level Dependency Map

(U.S. Domestic Fabs: ON Semi, Intel, TSMC AZ, Samsung TX/AZ)

This map identifies the structural dependencies that constrain fab sovereignty, fab uptime, and national resilience. Dependencies are grouped into five boundary layers:

1. Tooling
2. Materials
3. Workforce
4. Infrastructure
5. Governance and Geopolitical Exposure

Each dependency is mapped across the four major fab operators.

XVII. Tooling Dependencies

Tooling is the single largest foreign dependency for every U.S. fab.

Tool Category	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Lithography (ASML)	High	High	High	High
Etch (TEL, Lam)	High	High	High	High
Deposition (Applied, TEL)	High	High	High	High
Metrology (KLA)	High	High	High	High
CMP (Applied, Ebara)	High	High	High	High

Interpretation

All fabs share the same tooling choke points. This is a universal vulnerability.

XVIII. Materials Dependencies

Material Type	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
SiC Substrates	Low (vertical integration)	High	High	High
Silicon Wafers	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Specialty Gases	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Photoresists	High	High	High	High
Chemicals (HF, HCl, etc.)	Moderate	Moderate	High	High

Interpretation

ON Semi is the only U.S. fab operator with meaningful SiC sovereignty. TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ have the highest materials fragility.

XIX. Workforce Dependencies

Workforce Vector	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Technician Availability	High shortage	High shortage	High shortage	High shortage
Engineering Depth	Moderate	High	Moderate	Moderate
Fab‑Ready Certification	Low	Moderate	Low	Low
Foreign Worker Reliance	Low	Low	High	High

Interpretation

TSMC and Samsung rely heavily on foreign engineers, which introduces:

• visa risk
• geopolitical leverage
• operational fragility

ON Semi and Intel have domestic control, but still face workforce shortages.

XX. Infrastructure Dependencies

Infrastructure Type	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Water Supply	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Power Stability	Moderate	Moderate	High	Very High (Texas grid)
Logistics	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Regional Stability	High	High	Moderate	Moderate

Interpretation

TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ face significant infrastructure fragility, especially:

• water (Arizona)
• power (Texas)

ON Semiconductor and Intel are more stable, but not immune.

XXI. Governance and Geopolitical Dependencies

Governance Vector	ON Semi	Intel	TSMC AZ	Samsung TX/AZ
Foreign Ownership Risk	None	None	High	High
Export Control Exposure	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Geopolitical Leverage	Low	Low	Very High	High
Regulatory Capture Risk	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate

Interpretation

TSMC AZ is the largest geopolitical importation of risk into the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem. Samsung is similar, though less extreme.

ON Semiconductor is the lowest‑risk fab operator in the U.S. from a sovereignty standpoint.

XXII. Dependency Heat Map (Summary)

Fab	Tooling	Materials	Workforce	Infrastructure	Geopolitical	Net Dependency
ON Semi	High	Moderate‑Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Intel	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
TSMC AZ	High	High	High	High	Very High	Severe
Samsung TX/AZ	High	High	High	Very High	High	Severe

XXIII. Interpretation for National Strategy

1. ON Semi

• Most sovereign
• Lowest geopolitical exposure
• Strongest materials independence (SiC)
• Moderate tool/material dependencies

2. Intel

• Strong domestic anchor
• Mixed global footprint
• Moderate dependencies

3. TSMC AZ

• High capability
• Extreme geopolitical dependency
• High materials/tooling fragility

4. Samsung TX/AZ

• Strong manufacturing
• High foreign leverage
• Texas grid instability is a major risk

XXIV. FAB‑LEVEL DEPENDENCY ARCHITECTURE

(BSI Semiconductor Sovereignty Doctrine)

Purpose

To define the structural dependencies that constrain fab sovereignty, operational resilience, and national capability. This chapter establishes the dependency architecture for U.S. domestic fabs — ON Semi, Intel, TSMC AZ, and Samsung TX/AZ — using:

• Boundary‑systems analysis
• Sovereignty posture scoring
• Hybrid threat modeling

This chapter is a core component of the national semiconductor doctrine.

1. Dependency Categories

Dependencies are mapped across five boundary layers:

1. Tooling
2. Materials
3. Workforce
4. Infrastructure
5. Governance and Geopolitical Exposure

Each layer represents a potential failure mode, leverage vector, or sovereignty constraint.

XXV. Tooling Dependencies

Tooling is the largest foreign dependency for every U.S. fab.

Universal Tooling Choke Points

• ASML (lithography)
• Tokyo Electron (etch, deposition)
• KLA (metrology)
• Applied Materials (deposition, CMP)

Doctrinal Interpretation

Tooling is a non‑sovereign layer. No U.S. fab — including ON Semi — can operate without foreign tooling.

XXVI. Materials Dependencies

Key Materials

• Silicon wafers
• SiC substrates
• Specialty gases
• Photoresists
• High‑purity chemicals

Doctrinal Interpretation

ON Semi is the only U.S. fab operator with meaningful SiC sovereignty. TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ have the highest materials fragility.

XXVII. Workforce Dependencies

Structural Workforce Constraints

• Technician shortages
• Engineering shortages
• Fab‑ready certification gaps
• Foreign‑worker reliance (TSMC, Samsung)

Doctrinal Interpretation

Foreign‑worker reliance introduces:

• visa fragility
• geopolitical leverage
• operational instability

XXVIII. Infrastructure Dependencies

Critical Infrastructure Vectors

• Water
• Power
• Logistics
• Regional stability

Doctrinal Interpretation

TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ face severe infrastructure fragility:

• Arizona water scarcity
• Texas grid instability

XXIX. Governance and Geopolitical Dependencies

Foreign Ownership and Control

• ON Semi: none
• Intel: none
• TSMC AZ: high
• Samsung TX/AZ: high

Doctrinal Interpretation

TSMC AZ is the largest geopolitical importation of risk into the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem.

XXX. Dependency Heat Map

Fab	Tooling	Materials	Workforce	Infrastructure	Geopolitical	Net Dependency
ON Semi	High	Moderate‑Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Intel	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
TSMC AZ	High	High	High	High	Very High	Severe
Samsung TX/AZ	High	High	High	Very High	High	Severe

XXXI. Doctrinal Conclusion

The dependency architecture reveals:

• ON Semi and Intel are sovereign anchors
• TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ are capability imports with foreign leverage
• Tooling is a universal foreign dependency
• Materials sovereignty is emerging but incomplete
• Workforce shortages are systemic
• Infrastructure fragility is regional and severe

This chapter establishes the baseline for dependency‑reduction strategy.

XXXII. FAB‑LEVEL DEPENDENCY ARCHITECTURE

ON Semi’s sovereignty posture cannot be evaluated without mapping the dependency architecture that governs all U.S. fabs. This section integrates the full dependency map into ON Semi’s sovereignty assessment.

1. Tooling Dependencies

All fabs — including ON Semi — rely on foreign tooling (ASML, TEL, KLA). This is a universal vulnerability.

2. Materials Dependencies

ON Semi’s SiC vertical integration gives it a sovereignty advantage over Intel, TSMC AZ, and Samsung TX/AZ.

3. Workforce Dependencies

ON Semi faces domestic shortages but does not rely on foreign engineers, unlike TSMC and Samsung.

4. Infrastructure Dependencies

ON Semi’s Arizona footprint is more stable than TSMC AZ’s water‑intensive operations and Samsung’s Texas grid exposure.

5. Geopolitical Dependencies

ON Semi has no foreign ownership or control, giving it the lowest geopolitical exposure of the four.

6. Net Dependency Assessment

ON Semi’s dependency posture is moderate, significantly lower than foreign‑controlled fabs.

XXXIII. ON Semiconductor Corporation Dependency Reduction Strategy (5–10 Years)

This is the actionable, operator‑grade strategy to reduce ON Semi’s dependency footprint over the next 5–10 years.

1. Tooling Sovereignty Strategy

• Develop U.S. partnerships for sub‑systems (optics, stages, power modules)
• Co‑invest in domestic toolchain startups
• Build sovereign maintenance capability
• Reduce reliance on foreign field engineers

2. Materials Sovereignty Strategy

• Expand SiC vertical integration
• Acquire or partner with domestic wafer suppliers
• Localize specialty gas production
• Build domestic chemical purification nodes

3. Workforce Sovereignty Strategy

• Create ON Semi STEM academies
• Build technician pipelines with local colleges
• Implement fab‑ready certification programs
• Reduce reliance on foreign labor entirely

4. Infrastructure Resilience Strategy

• Secure long‑term water rights
• Build on‑site power redundancy
• Harden logistics corridors
• Develop regional resilience partnerships

5. Governance and Geopolitical Strategy

• Maintain U.S. ownership and control
• Formalize { "@type": "Thing", "name": "Supply Chain Risk" }, as critical infrastructure
• Integrate with national semiconductor grid
• Establish federal‑state resilience compacts

Findings

1. The United States has only twelve meaningful semiconductor manufacturers.

Not hundreds. Not dozens. Twelve. Of these, only five have national‑scale sovereignty relevance.

2. ON Semiconductor and Intel are the only sovereign domestic anchors.

• U.S. ownership
• U.S. control
• U.S. workforce
• U.S. operational footprint

They are the only fabs with both capability and sovereignty alignment.

3. TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ import foreign geopolitical risk into the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem.

They provide capability, not sovereignty. Their presence increases:

• foreign leverage
• workforce fragility
• geopolitical exposure
• supply chain dependency

4. Tooling is a universal foreign dependency for every U.S. fab.

ASML, TEL, KLA, Applied Materials — no domestic fab can operate without them. This is the single largest structural vulnerability.

5. Materials sovereignty is uneven and incomplete.

ON Semi is the only operator with meaningful SiC vertical integration. TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ have the highest materials fragility.

6. Workforce shortages are systemic and worsening.

Every fab faces:

• technician shortages
• engineering shortages
• certification gaps

TSMC and Samsung add visa fragility and foreign‑worker dependence.

7. Infrastructure fragility is regionally severe.

• Arizona: water scarcity
• Texas: grid instability
• Logistics: high fragility for foreign‑controlled fabs

8. The dependency heat map reveals two sovereign nodes and two severe‑risk nodes.

• Sovereign: ON Semi, Intel
• Severe Risk: TSMC AZ, Samsung TX/AZ

9. The U.S. semiconductor base is strategically concentrated and structurally fragile.

This concentration amplifies:

• escalation risk
• supply chain disruption
• geopolitical leverage
• national vulnerability

The United States Semiconductor Sovereignty Index establishes the first complete, doctrine‑aligned map of domestic semiconductor capability, dependency, and geopolitical exposure. It reveals a concentrated manufacturing base, uneven sovereignty posture, universal tooling dependency, and regionally severe infrastructure fragility.

The findings are clear: the United States possesses the technical foundation for semiconductor sovereignty, but not yet the structural independence required for long‑term national resilience. ON Semiconductor and Intel form the sovereign core. TSMC AZ and Samsung TX/AZ provide capability but import foreign leverage. Tooling remains the universal choke point. Workforce shortages and infrastructure instability constrain growth.

This Index provides the baseline for national strategy, capability development, and dependency‑reduction planning. It is the foundation upon which a sovereign, resilient, and future‑proof U.S. semiconductor ecosystem must be built. The next decade will determine whether the United States remains dependent on foreign manufacturing or achieves full semiconductor sovereignty.

This report is the first step in that transition.

Related Reports

These companion reports are part of the Black Star Institute (BSI) Supply Chain Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure Series. For the full collection, visit the Black Star Institute (BSI) Series hub.

• A Structural Assessment of GPU‑Backed Compute Financing and Emerging AI Acceleration Architectures
• Onshoring Without Sovereignty: Structural, Economic, and National Security Implications of Foreign‑Owned Semiconductor Fabs in the United States
• The United States Semiconductor Sovereignty Index: Fab‑Level Capability, Dependency, and Risk Architecture
• United States Semiconductor Sovereignty and Risk
• U.S. Domestic Availability of Critical Semiconductor Materials

Version

Version 1.0 — Published May 2026

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How to Cite This Report

Storm, Hunter. The United States Semiconductor Sovereignty Index: Fab‑Level Capability, Dependency, and Risk Architecture. Black Star Institute (BSI), Version 1.0, 2026.

For full citation standards and usage permissions, see the Black Star Institute (BSI) Citation and Usa

Disclaimer

This publication is provided for educational, analytical, and informational purposes. The Black Star Institute does not provide legal, regulatory, or compliance advice. All findings reflect independent, practitioner‑grade analysis based on publicly available information and BSI’s doctrinal frameworks at the time of publication. Institutions, policymakers, and organizations should consult appropriate legal or regulatory professionals before acting on any recommendations.

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The Black Star Institute (BSI) is the first and only boundary‑systems institute in the world — a sovereign, independent analytical institution that integrates the capabilities of a think tank, research lab, consultancy, and policy shop without inheriting their structural limitations or vulnerabilities. As a boundary-systems institute, BSI operates across human, machine, and institutional layers to diagnose systemic failure and define governance doctrine.

It is an independent research and governance organization focused on systemic‑risk analysis, automation failures, and human‑layer security. BSI examines how institutions, technologies, and decision systems break under real‑world conditions, producing artifacts that clarify failure modes, strengthen governance, and prevent recurrence. BSI’s sovereign, single‑operator architecture ensures authorship integrity and analytical independence across all research outputs.

BSI’s work integrates over three decades of cross‑sector experience in artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum, national security, critical‑infrastructure resilience, and emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) governance. Its research emphasizes authorship integrity, structural clarity, and practitioner‑driven analysis grounded in operational reality rather than narrative or theory.

Through the Black Star Institute, its founder, Hunter Storm publishes institutional frameworks, case studies, and governance artifacts that support organizations navigating complex technological, regulatory, and hybrid‑threat environments.

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