Black Star Institute

A national‑resilience analysis of U.S. semiconductor materials dependencies and the roadmap to restore domestic production of gallium, germanium, rare earths, high‑purity chemicals, and photoresists.

Black Star Institute

Supply Chain Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure Series — Report No. 05 (2026)

Author: Hunter Storm (https://hunterstorm.com)

Version 1.0 — Published May 2026

Supply Chain Sovereign and Critical Infrastructure Series

The Black Star Institute Supply Chain Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure Series examines the structural dependencies, geopolitical leverage points, and systemic vulnerabilities that define modern national resilience. This series analyzes how globalized production networks, foreign‑owned critical assets, and opaque vendor ecosystems create hidden single points of failure across energy, compute, logistics, and communications infrastructure.

The series is built on BSI’s doctrine that sovereignty is an engineering condition, not a political slogan. It evaluates how nations lose or regain control over essential capabilities through:

• Boundary‑Systems Analysis — mapping where foreign control intersects with domestic critical functions
• Institutional Integrity Assessment — identifying governance gaps that allow external actors to shape internal outcomes
• Hybrid‑Threat Modeling — examining how adversaries exploit supply chain opacity, regulatory drift, and infrastructure interdependence
• Trajectory Forecasting — projecting long‑term national risk based on current industrial, technological, and geopolitical vectors

This series provides operator‑grade clarity for policymakers, technologists, and institutional leaders navigating an era where supply chains are battlegrounds, infrastructure is contested terrain, and national resilience depends on the ability to see, secure, and sovereignly control the systems that underpin modern life.

1. Gallium

Can the U.S. produce it?

Yes — but we currently don’t.

Gallium is not mined directly; it’s extracted as a byproduct of:

• bauxite (aluminum ore)
• zinc processing

The U.S. has both industries, but:

• U.S. refineries do not currently extract gallium
• China controls ~98% of global gallium refining
• Restarting U.S. gallium refining is technically feasible but economically unattractive under current market conditions

Where could it be produced in the U.S.?

Regions with the right industrial base:

• Arkansas (bauxite legacy region)
• Texas (aluminum refining)
• Tennessee (aluminum smelting)
• Missouri (zinc processing)
• Alaska (zinc mining)

The bottleneck is refining, not geology.

2. Germanium

Can the U.S. produce it?

Yes — and we used to.

Germanium is a byproduct of:

• zinc ore
• coal fly ash

The U.S. has both, but:

• domestic refining capacity was shut down
• China now dominates global supply
• U.S. germanium production is technically feasible but dormant

Where could it be produced?

• Tennessee (zinc smelting)
• Alaska (Red Dog Mine — one of the world’s largest zinc mines)
• Pennsylvania / Midwest (coal fly ash recovery potential)

Again, the issue is refining, not resource availability.

3. Rare Earth Elements (REEs)

Can the U.S. produce them?

Yes — and we already do. But refining is the choke point.

Where?

• Mountain Pass, California — the only active rare earth mine in the U.S.
  • Produces significant REE ore
  • Ships most of it to Asia for refining
  • Refining capacity is being rebuilt but is not yet fully sovereign

Other potential regions:

• Wyoming
• Texas
• Alaska
• Appalachia (coal byproducts)

The U.S. has the geology — the bottleneck is processing and separation, which China dominates.

4. High‑Purity Chemicals

Can the U.S. produce them?

Yes — and we already do, but not at the scale required for full sovereignty.

High‑purity chemicals include:

• sulfuric acid
• hydrochloric acid
• hydrogen peroxide
• isopropyl alcohol
• high‑purity solvents
• CMP slurries

The U.S. has strong chemical manufacturing, but semiconductor‑grade purity requires:

• specialized plants
• ultra‑clean production
• extremely tight QA/QC

Where are they produced?

• Texas Gulf Coast (Houston, Beaumont, Port Arthur)
• Louisiana (chemical corridor)
• Midwest (industrial solvents)
• Arizona (semiconductor‑specific chemical suppliers near fabs)
• Oregon (supporting Intel)

The U.S. can scale this — it’s one of the easiest sovereignty gaps to close.

5. Photoresists

Can the U.S. produce them?

Partially — but not the most advanced types.

Photoresists are dominated by:

• Japan (JSR, Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, Shin‑Etsu)
• South Korea
• Taiwan

The U.S. has:

• some domestic production
• strong R&D
• limited high‑end EUV‑grade resist manufacturing

Where could the U.S. expand production?

• Arizona (TSMC + Intel ecosystem)
• Oregon (Intel ecosystem)
• New York (GlobalFoundries + Albany Nanotech)
• Texas (Samsung + TI ecosystem)

The U.S. can produce photoresists — but scaling EUV‑grade resist production requires major investment.

Bottom Line: Is Overseas Sourcing Necessary?

Here’s the truth:

• Gallium: Could be produced domestically — currently not.
• Germanium: Could be produced domestically — currently not.
• Rare Earths: Mined domestically — refining is the bottleneck.
• High‑Purity Chemicals: Produced domestically — scalable.
• Photoresists: Partially domestic — advanced types mostly foreign.

The U.S. is dependent on foreign supply not because we lack resources, but because we lack refining, processing, and advanced‑grade manufacturing capacity.

This is a policy and industrial‑capacity failure, not a geological one.

Why This Matters for National Security and Sovereignty

If the U.S. loses access to:

• gallium → no GaN power devices
• germanium → no infrared optics, no high‑efficiency solar, no fiber optics
• rare earths → no motors, no magnets, no defense systems
• high‑purity chemicals → fabs shut down
• photoresists → no lithography → no chips

These are single points of failure in the semiconductor ecosystem.

United States Critical Materials Sovereignty Extensions

1. U.S. critical materials sovereignty map (conceptual)

Think of four layers, not a pretty picture:

• Gallium (byproduct of bauxite/zinc): Potential/refining focus: Gulf Coast (TX, LA), Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, Alaska (zinc). Technically recoverable from existing streams; currently almost entirely unused domestically.
• Germanium (byproduct of zinc/coal fly ash): Potential: Alaska (Red Dog zinc), Tennessee (zinc smelting), coal regions in PA/WV/OH/IL for fly‑ash recovery.
• Rare earths: Current: Mountain Pass, California (active mine, partial processing). Potential: Wyoming, Texas, Alaska, Appalachia (coal byproducts).
• High‑purity chemicals & photoresists: Chemicals: TX–LA Gulf Coast, Midwest, AZ, OR, NY (fab‑adjacent). Photoresists: AZ, OR, NY, TX as natural co‑location with advanced fabs and R&D.

This is all feasible with investment and permitting, not science fiction.

2. State‑by‑state potential

Alaska

• Zinc (gallium/germanium byproduct), rare earth potential.
• Strategic for germanium and REE feedstock.

Arkansas

• Historic bauxite region → gallium potential if refineries recover it.

California

• Mountain Pass rare earths (mine + partial processing).
• Potential hub for REE separation and magnet supply chain.

Texas

• Aluminum, petrochemicals, high‑purity chemicals, fab‑adjacent (Austin, Taylor).
• Natural site for gallium recovery, chemicals, and photoresists.

Louisiana

• Alumina/chemical corridor → gallium + high‑purity chemicals.

Tennessee / Missouri

• Zinc smelting → germanium and gallium byproduct potential.

Wyoming / Appalachia (WV, PA, KY, OH)

• Coal and fly ash → germanium and rare earth recovery.

Arizona / Oregon / New York

• Fab‑adjacent chemicals and photoresists; logical sites for advanced‑grade materials.

3. Risk Matrix by Material

Material	Current US status	Main risk type	Time to fix (rough)
Gallium	100% import, no primary production	Refining + economic	3–7 years
Germanium	Import‑reliant, dormant potential	Refining + byproduct capture	3–7 years
Rare earths	Mining yes, full refining no	Separation + magnet chain	5–10 years
High‑purity chems	Domestic but not fully sovereign	Capacity + fab‑grade QA	2–5 years
Photoresists	Partial domestic, advanced mostly foreign	IP + process + scale	5–10 years

“Time to fix” assumes serious capital + permitting reform, not business‑as‑usual.

4. Policy Roadmap for Domestic Materials Independence

1. Stand up U.S. gallium and germanium recovery programs

• Fund byproduct recovery at zinc, bauxite, and coal‑ash facilities.
• Long‑term offtake contracts with fabs and defense.
• DOE/DoD anchor purchasing to de‑risk early plants.

2. Complete the rare earths loop onshore

• Expand Mountain Pass from ore → separated oxides → metals → magnets.
• Incentivize at least two independent REE separation facilities.

3. Scale high‑purity chemical capacity near fabs

• Co‑locate chemical plants with AZ/TX/OR/NY fabs.
• Create “semiconductor‑grade chemical” certification and long‑term contracts.

4. Build a U.S. photoresist ecosystem

• Joint ventures with Japanese/Korean firms for U.S. production.
• Co‑locate near advanced fabs; tie to CHIPS‑style incentives.

5. Regulatory and permitting reform

• Fast‑track critical‑materials projects with strict but predictable standards.
• Single federal lead agency per project to avoid death‑by‑process.

6. Strategic stockpiles

• Maintain 6–24 months of gallium, germanium, key REEs, and critical chemicals for defense + Tier 1 fabs.

5. Why This is Existential for AI and Cloud Providers

For Microsoft, AWS, Google, NVIDIA, etc., these materials are below the waterline of the iceberg:

• No gallium → constrained GaN power devices → less efficient data‑center power and RF.
• No germanium → impacts photonics, infrared, some high‑efficiency solar, specialty optics.
• No rare earths → no high‑performance motors, actuators, many defense and data‑center systems.
• No high‑purity chemicals → fabs stop; wafers don’t run.
• No photoresists → no lithography → no new chips → AI training/inference capacity flatlines.

From an AI/cloud perspective:

• These materials are the supply chain behind the GPUs.
• If they choke, compute becomes the new oil shock—but with no SPR equivalent.

Appendices

Secondary Key Phrases

• critical materials restart plans
• domestic gallium production
• domestic germanium refining
• U.S. rare earths supply chain
• semiconductor‑grade chemical production
• U.S. photoresist manufacturing
• semiconductor materials independence
• onshoring

Related Reports

These companion reports are part of the Black Star Institute (BSI) Supply Chain Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure Series. For the full collection, visit the Black Star Institute (BSI) Series hub.

• A Structural Assessment of GPU‑Backed Compute Financing and Emerging AI Acceleration Architectures
• Onshoring Without Sovereignty: Structural, Economic, and National Security Implications of Foreign‑Owned Semiconductor Fabs in the United States
• The United States Semiconductor Sovereignty Index: Fab‑Level Capability, Dependency, and Risk Architecture
• United States Semiconductor Sovereignty and Risk
• U.S. Domestic Availability of Critical Semiconductor Materials

Version

Version 1.0 — Published May 2026

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How to Cite This Report

Storm, Hunter. U.S. Domestic Availability of Critical Semiconductor Materials. Black Star Institute (BSI), Version 1.0, 2026.

For full citation standards and usage permissions, see the Black Star Institute (BSI) Citation and Usa

Disclaimer

This publication is provided for educational, analytical, and informational purposes. The Black Star Institute does not provide legal, regulatory, or compliance advice. All findings reflect independent, practitioner‑grade analysis based on publicly available information and BSI’s doctrinal frameworks at the time of publication. Institutions, policymakers, and organizations should consult appropriate legal or regulatory professionals before acting on any recommendations.

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The Black Star Institute (BSI) is the first and only boundary‑systems institute in the world — a sovereign, independent analytical institution that integrates the capabilities of a think tank, research lab, consultancy, and policy shop without inheriting their structural limitations or vulnerabilities. As a boundary-systems institute, BSI operates across human, machine, and institutional layers to diagnose systemic failure and define governance doctrine.

It is an independent research and governance organization focused on systemic‑risk analysis, automation failures, and human‑layer security. BSI examines how institutions, technologies, and decision systems break under real‑world conditions, producing artifacts that clarify failure modes, strengthen governance, and prevent recurrence. BSI’s sovereign, single‑operator architecture ensures authorship integrity and analytical independence across all research outputs.

BSI’s work integrates over three decades of cross‑sector experience in artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum, national security, critical‑infrastructure resilience, and emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) governance. Its research emphasizes authorship integrity, structural clarity, and practitioner‑driven analysis grounded in operational reality rather than narrative or theory.

Through the Black Star Institute, its founder, Hunter Storm publishes institutional frameworks, case studies, and governance artifacts that support organizations navigating complex technological, regulatory, and hybrid‑threat environments.

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